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Introduction
Liberal democratic theory has not adequately addressed the tension between
democracy and capitalism and this can be seen most clearly when trying to develop a
political theory of taxation. Liberal democratic and public finance experts on taxation
have focused on principles of justice and fairness. The imposition of specific kinds of
taxes on Africans well after the beginning of colonialism in South Africa will help
shed light on the internal challenges to liberalism that such a principled approach to
taxation reveals. Through an extended exegesis on colonial tax policy, I will show
how a faith in civilization, a racialized belief in the educative value of wage work, and
pure economic interest co-mingle in the liberal principled approach to taxes.
Taxation in the modern era both assumes people as wage earners and
constructs them as such. However, this observation has not been central to approaches
by public finance scholars or liberal theorists. More significantly, any theory of
taxation must attend to the historical presence of conversations around taxation that
focused on interaction between “coercion” of labor in opposition to slavery. While it
has been assumed that taxation is primarily for the accrual and maintenance of revenue
for a state, a rigorous analysis of the liberal approach to wage work in confrontation
with subsistence work reveals a more complex set of expectations and motivations
surrounding tax policy and tax theory. Though I focus here specifically on such
expectations in South Africa in the late 19th century, it is in order to illuminate a more
general point about the way that taxation functions in political communities. This
helps to expand the question of justice in taxation to include a more nuanced rendering
of how abstract principles of fairness or justice interact with ideologies of civilization
and work.
The ability to understand wage work as in tension with the practice of freedom
is made easier in the colonial South African example. This is not to suggest that
people no longer understand the way that taxation assumes wage earners, but to point
out that the initial coercive element of wage work changes over time to become less
contestable, more normalized. Moreover, wage work no longer confronts the political
theoretical landscape as a choice. Contemporary approaches to the question of
governance, like contemporary actors for the most part, do not experience wage work
as one option among many, but as the only option. In that sense, the vividness with
which we can perceive the nineteenth century confrontation between colonial
approaches and colonized people reflects on contemporary practice more than much
contemporary theory does.
In 19th century South Africa we have an interesting record of conversations
between and among Africans and Europeans as to the meaning of taxation for
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democracy. There are clear parallels between state formation in South Africa and the
United States that make the South African example helpful for understanding
contemporary political theory written by Americansi.
Rereading the historical
problem of taxation in colonial and post-colonial societies should involve the
recognition of a fundamental tension between democratic thought and the “necessary”
establishment of taxation. The anxiety of discovering a distinction between coercing
labor and providing incentives proves to be a central issue for the post-facto
legitimation of taxation. The conversations of the late 19th century in South Africa
around taxation draw attention to how democratic thought presupposes the consistency
of wage labor with democracy, perhaps to the detriment of the spirit of democracy.
The focus on the assumption of wage labor draws inspiration from Marx and many
thinkers in the Marxist tradition in order to draw attention to how deeply the
“economy” and “politics” are intertwined. Taxation is both a material and symbolic
focal point that reveals liberal approaches to work in tension with the ideal of
democracy as a move from slavery to freedom.
Un-free democratic subjects
Scholars studying colonialism have frequently stressed the importance of taxes
for promoting wage labor, but it also should also be added that tax policies were
intended to educate individual Africans into becoming paradoxically un-free
democratic subjects. By paradoxically un-free democratic subjects, I am suggesting a
potentially irresolvable tension between being a (coerced) wage earner and a
democratic actor. This tension was noticeably comprehended by colonial officials,
and the attempt to resolve it theoretically centered on the view that wage labor is
necessary for independence, which in turn can only be provided through a civilizing
state. The role that theories of civilization, race and pedagogical rule played in the
formation of the tax policies and subsequently the South African State are significant
in that they shed light on the meanings of taxation, not only in South Africa but
elsewhere. Tax policies in the colonial era were not merely a way of getting money
but were more fundamentally a way to create an African wage labor force.ii
Though tribute-paying and taxation were common among African
communities before the introduction of colonial taxation systems, iii the majority of
Africans in the interior of the southern Africa region were not integrated into the
world system until the late 19th and early 20th century. That is, most Africans lived in
dispersed economies, many of them subsistence oriented. There is little evidence to
suggest that northward expansion on the part of white settlers around the Cape of
Good Hope would have proceeded so quickly and drastically without the discovery of
diamonds and gold farther north in what is now South Africa. Despite several
hundred years of settlement (beginning with the Dutch in the 17th century) and the use
of copper, iron and gold in Southern Africa for over a millennium, the push to
introduce a coherent tax system on/for Africans can be plainly traced to the 1867
discovery of diamonds in the Vaal area of what was then a Boer Republic. By the
1860’s, European settlers (both British and Boer) were removing small outcrops of
copper in the Cape Colony and gold in the Eastern Transvaal but the discovery of
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diamonds sparked the massive influx of European capital and beginnings of ardent
South African state-building .iv
In 1867, the year that diamonds were discovered near the Orange River, the
Colonial Secretary “laid one of the earliest stones on the table of the Cape House of
Assembly [and said]…’Gentleman, this is the rock on which the future success of
South Africa will be built’.”v The mining rush that ensued led to the consolidation of
dispersed and disorganized small mining operations into large monopolies, led by
Cecil Rhodes, who eventually also became the Prime Minister of the Cape Colony.
What allowed such a rapid and complete involvement of British capitalists in the Vaal
area was the reduction of the autonomous powers of the Boer republics and the
ensuing dialogue between British colonial officials, Boer representatives, and (mostly
British) mine owners. Much of this dialogue involved strategies to create a labor force
to work the new and dangerous mines.
Despite the large numbers of people “available” as potential workers in the
mines, labor was experienced as a scarce resource to the early mine owners, Boer
representatives and colonial officials. In order to deal with this there was, according
to Farouk Stemmet, a period of enticement and then one of coercion in which taxes
were introduced.vi The initial period of enticement was based on a vague notion of
“free labor,” with the attendant expectation that the potential to earn cash was enough
to get workers into the dangerous mines, though it was a short time until farmers
advocated land restrictions and poll taxes were introduced in order to “ensure that no
African remained outside the imperatives of the cash economy.”vii This also ensured
that no African was too wealthy to avoid wage-labor by draining any surplus wealth
and labor that might have otherwise existed. This move to coerce Africans into wage
labor came after an attempt by the mine owners to bring in workers from China and
then India.viii
Sven Steinmo has traced the development of progressive taxes in Britain
around this time period. He argues that there were two forces in the changing world
political economy that explain the transformation from classical to modern tax
systems; “one supported political and social equality in society, the other demanded
increased revenues on the part of the state, and together these two impulses brought
about new tax ideas and structures.”ix Classical taxes had been complicated systems
with “little consistent logic driving the system as a whole or allowing people to make
sense of the choices of one type of tax over another—other than the state’s need for
money.”x In this sense it is interesting to note that what was so “progressive” about
progressive taxes is precisely that they have a justification beyond simply the need for
money by the statexi. Other theories of taxation offer an explanation of tax policy in
terms of the theory of predatory rule. Margaret Levi argues that “the history of state
revenue production is the history of the state.”xii In this sense the changes and reforms
of the revenue collection system, as well as the explicit and tacit aims of the system,
are a useful lens through which to view the evolution of the state more generally. Her
argument assumes that rulers are always maximizing state revenue but that they
operate within a system of constraints that in turn determine the choice of revenue
system. Within these constraints rulers will “design revenue production policies that
maximize revenues to the state.”xiii Levi’s model, then, is static “in the sense that, at
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any given point in time, policy choices are a consequence of a given set of bargaining
resources, transaction costs, and discount rates.”xiv
One of the many assumptions that Levi makes when looking at taxation and
revenue collection more generally is that individual tax payers have a certain amount
of choice in joining or not joining the state in question or that rulers recognize a
certain degree of responsibility towards those they are ruling.xv This assumption of
ruler accountability runs counter to evidence in most colonial situations.xvi This is
because rulers (however broadly understood in Levi’s account) are not faced with the
same constituent constraints in colonial situations. While they may continue to have
the constraints imposed on them by the constituents of the home country, colonialism
is usually characterized by its relative lack of concern for the indigenous peoples in
question. Levi and others assume that taxation schemes are always and primarily
about revenue collection. In fact, this is central to her argument. However, the
discovery of diamonds and gold in southern Africa prompted a whole series of tax
policies and land reforms that had as their stated objective the forced introduction of
Africans into wage labor via the moneyed economy.
Although revenue was of course collected, it is clear that revenue collection
was not the justification offered for the introduction of the system of taxation
(including Hut, head, dog and poll taxes) for Africans. When revenue collection was
mentioned during debates about taxing Africans, it was incidental. For example,
Charles Goldmann presented evidence in the Report of the Industrial Commission of
Inquiry into the Gold Mining Industry (1897) that “if the dignity of labor were
impressed upon [Africans] by the enforcement of this [native tax] law, we are likely to
get a larger supply. The other purpose served would be...additional revenue to the
Government.”xvii Here the idea is that Africans were not sufficiently schooled in the
practice of free labor; tax law would be an educative exercise. The justification
commonly associated with taxation systems (revenue collection) is explicitly stated as
secondary. As can be seen in the goal to create an African labor force, revenue
collection is far less important than theories of the educative goal of labor and
racialized assumptions about the importance of civilization.
Make the empire pay
In 1922 the retired British colonial official Sir Frederick Lugard published his
treatise The Dual Mandate in British Tropical Africa. Lugard’s text became the
virtual handbook of colonial officials in Africa after its publication.xviii In the context
of post-war Britain, Lugard’s book was timely to debates about imperialism, on the
one hand acknowledging that motivations on the part of Britain were not entirely for
the benefit of Africans but notably maintaining that the interests of the European
industrial classes are consistent with the British colonial mandate, most especially its
commitment to Africans. As a result, Lugard suggested that “the benefit can be made
reciprocal, and that it is the aim and desire of civilized administration to fulfil[sic] this
dual mandate.”xix He follows the logic of the principles of ability to pay and interest,
making him at least in part an heir to the legacy of Adam Smith and John Stuart
Mill.xx For him tax payment is tied up with the benefits of government and “marks the
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recognition of the principle that each individual in proportion to his means has an
obligation to the State, to which he owes security for life and property, and his
increased wealth,--due to fair wages for his labor, improved transport, and a large
competitive market for his produce.”xxi In this section I will highlight now a mix of
racialized assumptions and a view of the educative function of wage labor for freedom
came together in colonial tax policy.
Lugard recommends that compulsion to work is no longer a good justification
for “native taxation.” Citing Cecil Rhodes’ 1894 Glenn Grey Act in South Africa, he
argues that such a system had as its goal a means of compelling individual Africans to
work.xxii He notes that the impetus behind the Act was a consideration that “the
native…should be made to work, because he had for so long forced his women to
work in order that he might live in idleness.”xxiii He also usefully points out that this
reasoning has precedent; “the substitution of labor for the payment of a tax, or the
imposition of a heavier tax if the native cannot prove that he has worked for a
specified time, are expedients which in the past have been adopted elsewhere.” xxiv In
this way, it is widely understood that taxation was a means to self-consciously enlarge
the wage labor force. While Lugard argues against this principle of taxation as
creating wage labor, he specifically ascribes its inception to South Africa in the late
19th century, invoking Poll taxes at the request of mine management and European
farmers. In other words, thirty years after the discovery of diamonds and gold in
South Africa, it was well understood that taxes had been created not for revenue but to
coerce Africans into the mines.
In discussing further his approach to taxes, he emphasizes the idea that a
personal contribution to the state (and he here suggests it should be in proportion to
wealth) is something that needs to be both taught and learned. As such, he
recommends that taxes should be extremely light in the beginning, “since it is there
intended to be educative rather than a source of revenue.”xxv In a sense the argument
presented here is a semantic one; the compulsion to work was directed both at the
individual African perceived as lazy (taxation as education for the individual African)
and at an entire black labor force that needed to be incited by coercion (taxation as a
means of forcing people out of traditional economies more generally). The two are
inextricably bound. The point is that while the institution of tax systems was
consciously implemented to coerce labor it was also executed as a method of political
education. The two motivations were not always clearly demarcated. Moreover,
Lugard eclipses the original motivation of policies such as the Glen Grey Act that are
aimed at creating a labor force, perhaps updating the language.
Under normal conditions the African rarely needs
compulsion to work, and this is not the object of the tax
I have proposed, but in so far as the tax stimulates
productive industry, and compels a man, as in England,
to provide an extra margin wherewith to meet the
obligation, or if it diminishes the large surplus of the
grain crops, which among many pagan tribes is set aside
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for brewing liquor with which to indulge in frequent
drunken orgies, its effect can only be good.xxvi
While on the surface Lugard is merely refuting the idea that compulsion to work is the
motivation behind taxation, what he is also saying is that it is not unusual (nor the
same) to argue that taxation stimulates more productivity. This is perhaps double
speak in the sense that he is arguing that Africans may not need stimulus to work but if
that is the effect, that is a good thing. Moreover, making the assumption that workers
will spend their wages on consumption goods like alcohol or will use grain for that
purpose is presumptuous. However, it should be noted that Lugard himself makes the
link between the principle of establishing workers via taxation in South Africa with a
similar effect in England.
The civilizing mission, according to Lugard, is very much a system of
education. Instead of reading this educative function easily, I propose that it is a very
powerful metaphor that requires much attention and perhaps can shed light not only on
the colonial context, but government more broadly understood. Here taxation is
understood to play a metaphorically educative role, though sometimes it is confusedly
intertwined with literally changing behavior rather than promoting an understanding.
In a sense we may understand the educative mission of the British through Lugard as
having a component of a rote learning method where literal action in successive
repetition (i.e.: labor) educates the student in that action. Lugard calls upon fellow
colonial official Lord Milner to emphasize the distinction; it “is absolutely opposed to
compulsory labour for private employment…It is a point of fundamental
importance…that there is no question of force or compulsion, but only of
encouragement and advice through the native chiefs and headmen.”xxvii The issue of
to what degree labor could be enforced or imposed was prickly in colonial policy and
theory, in no small part because many reasoned that the benefit of colonial rule
involved the abolition of slavery. In this sense, it understandably became confusing to
the British officials and certainly to Africans subject to colonial policies, as to the
difference between slavery and wage labor that was, they saw, coerced in sometimes
subtle but more often explicit ways.
As for the issue of racialized assumptions, I read Lugard’s work as a whole as
having a consistency in its approach to questions that involve allegedly immutable
ascriptive characteristics of Africans. Despite noting obvious differences among
colonies, The Dual Mandate as a whole posits an “African” or “Native” character that
appears at least to Lugard to be interchangeable in various locations and consistent
across the vast continent. For this reason, and also because of explicit claims on his
part, it is useful to read his remarks as if they might guide South African policy (or,
had previously), despite the fact that South Africa was no longer under British control
at the time. So when he says that “it has long been the fashion to speak of the African
as naturally lazy, leaving work to his women, and contented to lie in the sun and eat
and drink”xxviii it is with the assumption that this is a character attribute associated with
Africans in general, regardless of their physical locale. While he observes the
“fashion” of speaking of Africans in this way, Lugard also refutes the stereotype and
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submits a new one; “It would seem, however…that there are few races which are more
naturally industrious.”xxix
This “natural industriousness,” Lugard continues, applies to labor performed
for wages as well.
As a wage-earner he has not the plodding application of
the Chinaman, and ‘he makes no pretence of taking
pride in planting cotton or tobacco for someone else,’
says Mr. Wilson; but this writer emphatically denies that
the native in Nyasaland [Malawi] is idle and leaves most
of the work to his women, and he cannot think why
Europeans persist in assuming that a Native lives in
degrading idleness unless working for a European.xxx
At this point Lugard is answering Mr. Wilson’s piece on the character of work in
Nyasaland (modern-day Malawi) natives in particular. It is clear from the context of
his remarks as a whole that this is an evidentiary accident in the sense that it though
Lugard certainly has been to Nyasaland, he is referring to a more general characteristic
of “Africans” throughout the continent. This approach to the question of work seems
to be a remarkably progressive one, at least in the sense that Lugard is poking fun at
the idea that Europeans consider African labor as valid and useful only when it is work
for Europeans. What is unclear from this passage though is whether Lugard is
consciously aware that wage work is specifically associated in the African context
with work for Europeans. Wage work depends on a uniformly accepted currency, or
something with which to pay wages, a notably missing component outside of work for
Europeans.
Responding again, this time to a Mr. Orr, Lugard continues his defense of the
African work ethic, again highlighting the role that incentives play.
As to the quality of the work done by the wage-earner,
Captain Orr says, I think very truly: ‘The whole question
of industry and idleness depends almost on incentive.
When the African native is given an incentive to work,
he will work in a way that is sometimes
astounding…Give him an interest in his task, encourage
his initiative by making him think for himself, thrust
responsibility upon him, demand results, and not the
mere mechanical performance of labor, and he will be
found surprisingly industrious.xxxi
Here again is Lugard’s relatively progressive attitude, but this time betraying
assumptions that may be less about African workers than workers in general. The
most important distinction here is that the quality of work depends on the context in
which incentives are offered, as well as the content of the incentives themselves. In
this way, Lugard and Orr make the case that labor is most effective when it is the
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result of at least a degree of initiative on the part of the worker. Further, it seems to
imply that self-initiative (thinking for oneself, having a real purpose or goal, taking
pride in the work) is an important component of the structuring of work environments.
In retrospect, we can see that this is consistent with the approach to work of British
liberalism, at least in theory.
Lugard’s views on work need to be put further into context because of the
presumption that there are situations in which labor can and should be coerced. His
understanding that there is a space where coercion is justified provides a limit case for
his own views. This is because he is reflecting on the assumption that there may be
conditions under which the coercion of labor is still consistent with the concept of
“free labor” as wage work is often referred to. So, Lugard asks, “in what
circumstances and by what methods, then, is it justifiable for a Government to resort
to compulsion in the employment of paid labor?”xxxii The phrasing of the question
already reveals an important assumption: that there are circumstances and methods by
which it is justifiable for governments to resort to compulsion. His answer, though, is
even more illuminating.
The reasons given in the bluebook for compulsion in
East Africa do not appear to be limited to Government
necessity, but include desirability of training the natives
to work, so that they shall not “live in idleness and
vice.” The payment of tax by labor in lieu of cash, as in
Uganda, is a different matter, and, as I have said, it is
preferable that the labor should be paid in full and the
amount of the tax subsequently refunded, so as to make
the distinction perfectly clear.xxxiii
The link between compulsion to work and taxation seems, even if somewhat
confusing, to be a direct association. The Uganda example should also be juxtaposed
to an earlier, and perhaps more severe, illustration of the relationship in the Congo.
Early colonial rule in the Congo was directly tied to the extraction of rubber from the
interior of the country. For this reason, the imposition of taxes and the connection to
forced labor was pronounced because rather than paying taxes in currency, African
men over a certain age were required to bring a pre-allotted amount of rubber directly
from the interior. This tax came with the penalty of limb loss, and it is perhaps
important that taxation became synonymous in the Congo with cruelty and forced
labor.xxxiv
In some sense, what Lugard is referring to is a practice of “hiding” the
magnitude to which taxation obliges labor. The connection between forced labor and
taxation is seen in coincidence, again, with education. So it is no surprise that Lugard
dwells on the educative effects of compulsory labor.
The educative results of compulsory labour depend on
the conditions under which it is employed, and are not a
primary reason for resorting to compulsion for public
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works, for it is, of course, possible to compel natives to
work for their own or their community’s benefit instead
of for the white man’s wages.xxxv
This nuanced understanding of the interaction between education, compulsion, and
wage labor again upholds an evident progressive allure on the surface. One interesting
distinction in this passage, though, is the relative equation of public works with white
man’s wages, juxtaposed against “their own or their community’s benefit.” This is
perhaps an oversight, but a significant one for the overall argument that Lugard is
trying to sustain about the mutually beneficial colonial system because it really does
discern a difference between what might be of benefit to Africans and what is of
benefit to Europeans, without bridging the gap in between and arguing that they are
consistent with each other.
This underestimation of lack of mutual benefit seems all the more glaring
because Lugard has at least some recognition of the distinct distrust with which many
Africans viewed wage work. However, his interpretation of this skepticism is that
“primitive tribes are suspicious, and fear employment by the white man.”xxxvi He
maintains hope, however, that this suspicion will be remedied with the advent of the
work itself for he argues that “in such a case the wages paid, and the good treatment
received, should have the effect of removing these fears and suspicions, so that
compulsion may no longer be necessary, and free voluntary labor take its place.”xxxvii
The logic here is that people fear what they do not know and once they know
something, it will no longer be feared. Under this explanation the payment of the
wage dispels the fear. In another sense it is also perhaps quite candid reasoning on
his part; people may fear and resent wage work, but once it becomes normalized and
regularized, it will be accepted and no longer feared. The process of normalization
includes not only an increased familiarization with wage work, but also and more
importantly recognition that it is no longer a choice.
While Lugard may hope that the suspicion of wage work will be a mere kink to
be worked out in the process of wage labor itself, he is also somewhat indeterminate
about the extent to which the rectifying of this suspicion should be the motivation for
labor policies. Rather, when the issue becomes one of the “benefit” of the African, he
quickly suggests that it is quite a different matter altogether, asserting that it is a
matter to be dealt with in education, not labor. The link between the two is clear to the
reader, even if Lugard tries to separate them from one another. So, when Lugard
establishes that “The question of the measure of compulsion which is admissible or
advisable in order to induce the African to work, solely for his own moral and material
benefit and advancement, is one which belongs rather to the subject of education than
to that of labor,”xxxviii he appears to be trying to unscramble issues that are inevitably
scrambled. He also seems to recognize the degree to which the question of the benefit
to African laborers was dealt with within the context of questions about labor. Why
might Lugard want to disentangle the developmental advantages of labor and move
them to education? Perhaps compulsory African labor was not intended to benefit the
Africans in any way, but was to benefit European colonialists and the home country,
often explicitly so. Any reflection on the benefits to Africans seems post hoc and
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perhaps merely justifications for existing policies. But, the purpose of the Dual
Mandate was to argue that the system was mutually beneficial, so why not take the
issue head on, in the realm of labor where it really began? Perhaps Lugard has seen
the limits to his own argument, or perhaps he is less reflexive on the connection
between labor and education than he seems.
For Lugard mere compulsion to work wasn’t necessarily of benefit to Africans,
in itself. Understandably a ridiculous proposition for contemporary ears (at least
framed in this way), it was not necessarily so at that time. For example, his views are
in part formed in response to the East African Bishops who supported the idea that
obligation to work is “in itself a justifiable means to an end – the advancement of the
natives themselves.”xxxix Rather, Lugard’s own views seem to be more indirect. That
is, he seems to suggest, again, that work itself should not necessarily be a goal, nor is
it necessarily of benefit per se to Africans. In his remarks on education, it does become
somewhat clearer as to what the indirect benefit of work would be on Africans. For
Lugard “the object which education in Africa must have in view must be to fit the
ordinary individual to fill a useful part in his environment, with happiness to
himself.”xl This is consistent with a liberal approach to taxation in general. Similarly,
he goes on to clarify that education is “to ensure that the exceptional individual shall
use his abilities for the advancement of the community and not to its detriment, or to
the subversion of constituted authority.”xli The simultaneous objectives of making
individuals useful, advancing the community, and buttressing authority are the
lynchpins of civilization.
The civilizing mission, Lugard observes, comes with a capacity for unintended
consequences that may in turn sabotage the character of the mission. So, when
Lugard notices that “the impact of European civilization on tropical races has indeed a
tendency to undermine that respect for authority which is the basis of social order,”xlii
he is burdened with the task of reconciling this observation with the goal of
constituting authority. Ultimately, Lugard’s response discloses an inconsistency that
is probably widespread: creating self-confident and empowered citizens in the arts of
democracy, at the risk of undermining constituted authority because it ostensibly
promotes self-government. However, for Lugard the outcome is already established,
and its authority has already been constituted. So rather than attack this fundamental
discrepancy, Lugard contextualizes that the social order being undermined in the case
of colonialism is, or should be, local (African) authority. Here the uprooting of the
social order is a “measure of progress”xliii because it will be replaced by a different
(and better) liberal social order. Lugard’s understanding of education in this way
noticeably elides the possibility that the liberal order itself is undermined by the
teaching of its major principles.xliv
The motivation behind Lugard’s focus on education, then, brings us full circle.
He argues that the colonial state should be responsible for educating Africans
precisely because it is “our duty to the natives, and our responsibility to
civilization.”xlv The duality of the British mandate is responsibility toward African
subjects, though the relationship between their subjecthood and citizenship remains
elusive. Through moral instruction, Lugard maintains, good character can be molded
best by example and personal contact, rewarding “honesty, self-control, and
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industry”xlvi in African students. Moreover, he appeals to his European readers that “It
is indeed essential that democracy should take an intelligent and well-informed
interest in questions which affect the Empire of which it is the inheritor and
trustee.”xlvii Lugard is confident that the burden of the British mandate will be
rewarded.xlviii The idea that Africans enjoy more freedom under the colonial state
seems misplaced now, but there was logic to the connection for Lugard. His faith in
the British Empire was based on a belief in a certain kind of responsibility toward
Africans. This responsibility is inextricably linked to the justifications for, or
explanations of, taxation in the context of British rule. In this sense, taxation was
integral to his view that the liberal democratic state performs an educative function
through wage labor that characterizes civilization.
Meanings of taxation
The tension in the colonial context between racialized assumptions, wage
labor, and civilization can be clarified somewhat by examining Marx’s views of
freedom and how that relates to taxation. For Marx, “taxes are the economic basis of
the government machinery and nothing else.”xlix There is, however, a deep interaction
between the institution of taxation and the perpetuation of an illusory form of human
freedom. Lugard’s struggle with the difference between free and coerced labor as it
relates to taxation should be seen in light of his unwillingness to question the marriage
of civilization and capitalism. This would come as no surprise to Marx, though, for he
once said that “taxation is the fifth god, side by side with property, the family, order,
and religion.”l This diagnosis of capitalism is in large part because of the effect of
economic structures on the ability of people to relate to each other as humans. For
Marx human nature can be illustrated by the concept of “species being.”li The lack of
consciousness and will characterized by wage labor is an obstacle to human
fulfillment and therefore to species being because, according to Marx, it prohibits us
from seeing each other as part of the same species. Capitalist society has been
structured by economic relationships that render human relationships abject.
Humans are alienated from one another as a result of the particular structure of
production under capitalism. The concept of alienation works on multiple levels,
though, and the first important facet of it concerns workers being alienated from the
product of their work. In this way, a worker’s labor “becomes an object” that “exists
outside him” and further becomes “a power of its own confronting him.”lii It exists
outside of the worker precisely because she does not own the product but is paid a
wage to produce it, thereby rendering her influence on the product non-existent and
controlled by another (the owner of the product who pays her the wage to produce it).
The worker continues to produce under this system because she is coerced to do so in
order to live within a market-society for which the worker has nothing to offer but her
labor.liii If she did have something else to offer, she would be a part of the owning
class. As it is, though, she does not work freely precisely because there is no option of
declining to work. For Marx, it is through work that we create what it means to be
human, which is why when work is not deliberate but forced we become alienated
from our work, ourselves, and other humans. Moreover, because of the lack of control
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over the product and work process, alienation makes biological survival the purpose of
the species, contra our nature.liv In part because of this, a further aspect of alienation
concerns Marx: the propensity under capitalism to compete with other human beings
rather than work with them.
In contradistinction to alienation, Marx and Engels make use of a concept of
freedom that is marked by its difference from liberal conceptions of freedom. For
them, freedom is tied directly to consciousness in that a human being is free if he
“contemplates himself in a world he has created.”lv Under capitalism, the worker still
participates in creating the world, but is unable to contemplate this relationship
properly because of her alienation from her own work, herself, and others. The
alienation of workers affects the potential for freedom in society as a whole, for
though personal freedom may exist under capitalism to a certain degree, the capitalist
mode of production does not allow for humans to consciously plan their production
processes with a view to how this will affect the nature of society and human nature.
The idea here is that “freely associated human beings” is a direct result of productive
mechanisms.lvi Instead, what we have under capitalism is not only worker alienation
in the sense that people are forced to take orders, do repetitive work, and have no real
say over working hours or decisions affecting the work process, but also in the sense
that workers themselves are commodified.
In that sense, the uneasy distinction that Lugard was trying to designate
between wage labor, education and slavery breaks down from a Marxist perspective.
Lugard’s faith in civilization and attempt to articulate a dual mandate is reflective of a
fetishstic approach to the state. The attempt to provide a non-coercive rationale for
taxation masks the prior coercive nature of the wage labor itself, which was itself the
impetus for the taxes in the first place. The slippage between coercion and incentive
in wage labor was understood by colonial subjects to a greater extent than by colonial
officials, and it impacts the view one might take on meaning of civilization. In 1957
Lord Hailey remarked “it might almost be said that the African begins to be
recognized as a member of civilized society when he becomes subject to the payment
of income tax instead of poll tax.”lvii His argument is that Africans have now earned
the right to be subject only to income or property taxes, like Europeans of the time.
Income taxes are paid on income earned, whereas the taxes most used in the colonial
context weren’t pegged to income but were pegged to the individual qua individual.
In order to understand the relevant distinction between taxes on income and a poll tax,
we can examine why resistance to taxes took the forms that it did.
In the late 19th century African resistance to taxation can be traced to an
editorial in the first African language newspaper in South Africa, by its founder, J.T.
Jabavu. In it he makes a case against the taxation policies of the government while
also accepting the civilizing discourse that accompanies it. Jabavu, an early African
activist, was often criticized as reformist at the time of the African National Congress
(ANC)’s formation. In the late nineteenth century, however, he was in a unique
position to speak out against government policies, and in Xhosa.
Published in
November of 1884, Jabavu’s editorial in Imvo Zabantsundu does not question the right
of the government to tax Africans, but asserts that they are unable to pay. There is no
doubt, for Jabavu, that “the Natives owe the money” but the question of when and by
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what means is what occupies his piece. So, as he points out “It will be said, as it was
said in the meeting, these people must go to work. But it is not easy to get our people
to do two things at once.”lviii The purpose here was to convince the government to not
seize cattle and land because taxes had not been paid. However, he grants the idea
that Africans must go to work, but does not point out in any way that the “other” thing
that they must do is also to work. That is, his argument is that many Africans need to
be out in the fields for subsistence work, but that eventually they will have time to
return to wage work. This is perhaps one of the reasons Jabavu later comes under
much fire from the ANC, for he is extremely careful to not disrupt the purposes of
government more than is necessary for his modest aims.
Historian Sean Redding has observed that it is unexpected, given the harshness
and inequality of tax policy toward Africans in South Africa, that there were
surprisingly few revolts. Her explanation for this is that, at least in the case of the
1880 Transkeian Rebellion, “the collection of hut tax became a state ritual that
recreated and reinforced bonds between ruler and ruled.”lix More importantly, though,
she shows the way in which taxation and witchcraft united to make the colonial state
seem particularly malicious and that the information on hut tax registers represented a
potential threat to the African population. This threat was material and supernatural.
As such, she concludes that relatively high compliance rates on the part of Africans
can be explained by the symbolic content of tax payments, “reflecting an
acknowledgement of the historical reality of the loss of African independence.”lx This
loss of independence was accompanied by relative lack of interaction between the
state and many Africans, apart from the payment of taxes, which Redding argues were
a form of “buying” autonomy from the state.lxi Redding’s research highlights the way
that many Africans took note of the contradictory nature of Lugard’s defense of
taxation.
In part this symbolic interaction over taxation can be seen as a confrontation
between modes of viewing the world that are materially based, but that mix with
existing non-material beliefs. Rosa Luxemburg’s The Accumulation of Capital was
first published in 1913 and provides an interpretation not only of imperialism, but of
taxation. This interpretation helps to make sense of how and why many Africans saw
taxes as especially malevolent. Luxemburg argues that the primary way in which
states can use taxation is to create a consumption class, “non-capitalist consumers,”lxii
coexistent with economies that are non-capitalist. It is one of Luxemburg’s greatest
contributions to Marxism that she pointed out that capitalist and non-capitalist modes
of production co-exist. Moreover, the existence of non-capitalist modes may be in the
interest of capital. In her view, modern taxation is “responsible for forcing commodity
economy on the peasants,”lxiii but the way that it does this is by forcing them to
produce more and more for the market – not necessarily producing more, but certainly
producing more as commodities. In this way it also increases commodity
consumption because people are no longer as able to fulfill their own needs via their
own production, since a portion of it must become commodities in the sense that they
must be traded for money. So, for Luxemburg it is the case that
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Capitalism is the first mode of economy with the
weapon of propaganda, a mode which tends to engulf
the entire globe and to stamp out all other economies,
tolerating no rival by its side. Yet at the same time it is
also the first mode of economy which is unable to exist
by itself, which needs other economic systems as
medium and toil.lxiv
And for Luxemburg, taxation was a method both of promoting capital, and also of
preserving other economies to a certain extent while coexisting with a capitalist mode
of production. The case of South Africa seems to be a good example of this. And in
fact, Luxemburg’s approach to South Africa makes a nice juxtaposition with Lugard’s.
She contrasts the methods of the British with those of the Boers, arguing that the
Boers stood for “out-dated slavery on a petty scale” while the British supported
“modern large-scale capitalist exploitation of the land and natives.”lxv Moreover, she
points out that the British government “for a long time…appeared as protector of the
natives,”lxvi an appearance no doubt reinforced by Lugard’s Dual Mandate only nine
years later. According to Luxemburg, though, “British capital revealed its real
intentions”lxvii only after diamonds and gold were discovered.
When Lugard wrote The Dual Mandate, he was in part responding to Leonard
Woolf’s Empire and Commerce in Africa: A Study in Economic Imperialism. Woolf’s
analysis bears some affinity with Luxemburg’s, and was published in 1920. In this
book, Woolf makes a number of observations that provide useful context for Lugard’s
approach. One thing he points out is the affinity of the contemporary state to a jointstock company.lxviii This is an apt metaphor for his topic because it was joint-stock
companies that blazed the trail for colonial authority. While to a certain extent his
analysis contains an economic determinism in that he assumes that organized national
power is also primarily an economic instrument, the interpretation makes sense in its
historical moment as a counter to the hegemonic liberal discourse defending
colonialism and imperialism. Moreover he cites Chamberlain directly on this point,
making a strong case that he is merely representing the stated aim that “the state…is
an organization for the pursuit of the economic ends of nations.”lxix With critical
appraisals of the state’s actions in Africa and elsewhere, Lugard felt it was his duty to
defend colonial policies by introducing the “dual mandate” approach, reconciling the
stated aims of economic advancement for the British Empire with the traditional tenets
of liberalism.
The theoretical importance attached to taxation in the context of civilization by
Lugard and Hailey is not confined to African colonization. Oliver Wendall Holmes
reported said that “Taxes are the price we pay for a civilized society” and this
subsequently became the maxim of the IRS. Contemporary approaches to taxation do
not effectively attend to the interaction between taxes and the coercion of wage work.
The link between taxes and this coercion is in part done through a conception of
civilization that posits the overthrow of slavery and the implementation of free labor
as a distinctive moment which elides and “forgets” that this transition came with much
ambiguity over the difference between incentives, coercion, and slavery. When
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Lugard observed that hut taxes were intended as a symbol or representation of
population, he reflected on this with some hesitation. In part this is because he
understood all too well that this was comprehended by Africans subject to the tax. In
a letter to the Spectator in 1898, the explorer Mary Kingsley observes that Africans
assume that “the thing you pay any one a fee for is a thing which is not your own.” lxx
Lugard cites this as the reason why hut taxes have had an unfortunate reception in
Nigeria. Lugard sees this is evidence for more decentralized control for the
administration of taxes, using the observation to argue for tax collection by chiefs, a
hallmark of the theory of indirect rule. But I read the significance of Kingsley’s
remark differently.
It escapes the observation of both Kingsley and Lugard that perhaps the
African’s negative reaction to the hut tax in the language of “fees” was more rigorous
than their own understandings of how the tax functions; it is in fact perfectly rational.
The counterpoising of slavery and freedom has a powerful precedent in western
political philosophy. But as practice, this counterpoising has been more ambivalent.
The idea that one would be required to pay a fee or “tax” on something does assume
that one is not entitled to “full” ownership of it. In the case of the hut tax, it was in
part a confiscation of property when the British asked for taxes based on the mere
existence of huts. Additionally, when other kinds of taxes (like poll or head taxes)
made their appearance it was with a similar understanding. Though Redding shows
some of the ways that the taxes were incorporated into already existing African belief
systems, it is also useful to think of how, despite ideological arguments otherwise,
many people subject to a tax for the first time experience it with reasoned clarity that
is then lost over years of habitual subjection. The combined analysis of taxes as
blurring the distinction between slavery, coercion, incentives, and education alongside
the observation of them having the consequence of making Africans “misunderstand”
the purpose of the tax, make a strong case for it being a significant phenomenon.
Montesquieu wrote in 1748 that "a tax per head is the most natural to slavery; a
tax on goods the most natural to liberty, because it comes home less directly to the
person."lxxi Only ten years later Rousseau follows this up; "We find in 'L'Esprit des
Lox' [Montesquieu] that an impost per head is most proper to servitude, and real
taxation more conformable to liberty. That would be incontestable, if 'circumstances
per head' were equal."lxxii Rousseau goes on to argue that if the rate per head is
proportioned to the means of the individual then the head tax ceases to be the closest
thing to servitude. He is exactly right, but once proportionality enters the equation, the
tax ceases to be a head tax as we know it (in the southern African sense). Democracy,
by all counts, should be the opposite of servitude. Yet, Athenian democracy was built
on the labor of slaves and was marked, interestingly, by four classes of differing tax
paying groups, the slave class being exempt from taxes precisely because they had no
rights to government, but existed as property.lxxiii This is what is so striking about the
imposition of the head tax in particular in South Africa, and perhaps why I read
Kingsley’s comment as significant, if out of context. Full citizenship in Athenian
democracy was associated with not paying taxes, while paying taxes was associated
with being a subject. Though in both cases slavery is associated with not having to
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pay taxes, the logic has shifted such that now liberal citizenship can be (ostensibly)
reconciled with tax payment.
Conclusion
Lugard’s views on taxes, though obviously informed by a paternalistic racism,
are indicative of a larger problem for democratic theory. Lugard carefully spelled out
the tension between how taxes coerce labor and how that might relate to broader goals
of human fulfillment that underlie the spirit of democracy. But even while he saw the
tension, he did not seek to resolve it. I would suggest that this is because taxation is
reified in democratic thought. It is an institution that is assumed, not deduced. The
fundamental relationship between the symbolic and material content of the payment of
taxes has been explored, but only so far. Redding’s historical work on taxes in South
Africa help shed some light on how, and perhaps why, the payment of taxes in
democratic practice has to be processed outside of the discourse of liberal thought,
colonial or otherwise. As Marx has pointed out, work is central to the fulfillment of
human potentiality. Therefore, it should be of central concern to any political theory
that takes seriously that self-government is a good thing. Possibly the most important
aspect of self-government is that it is not predetermined in the sense that if it is truly
generated by the “self” (variously understood as an individual, a collective, or most
importantly, fragmented) one cannot predict what it will do. Even the “self” cannot
predict it.
Providing incentives for democratic citizens to work seems to be an
unquestionable mark of progress and civilization for many people, most especially
Lugard. But as Redding has shown, these “incentives” are not processed as such by
those who receive them. Contemporary democratic thought and practice is not so
different from 19th century South African colonial democratic thought. We maintain
the same assumption that wage work is consistent with democracy. However, wage
work begins and ends with fundamental inequality of resources and opportunity. The
observation that some people must provide “incentives” to others to work should
already signal a problem of essential hierarchy. If work begins and ends with the
individual, freely chosen, incentives would not be necessary. But of course that is not
why incentives, the most clear one being taxes, exist. They exist to convince people to
do work for others that they otherwise would not do. That is fundamentally coercive,
and people do experience it as such. In that way taxes are fundamentally in tension
with democratic thought.
Rather than being solved, this tension has been displaced. Many Africans, as
Redding shows, displace the tension into a mix of material and supernatural
explanations. The mixing of the two results in recognition of the power of the state
that really does treat it not as some version of the “self” but as something exterior,
something god-like. This is not unlike contemporary understandings of the
democratic state, where the assumption of the authority to tax marks a relationship to
governance that flies in the face of the spirit of democracy as having contingent
outcomes. The fetishization of taxation as a democratic institution also inhibits our
ability to see clearly that the “economy” and “politics” are intimately connected.
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Moreover, this treating of taxes in a fetishistic manner makes it difficult to imagine a
world where we work and govern of our own free will.
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